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6.1  Introduction 
The economics of the U.S. steel industry is not simple. Much maligned and 
much studied, the U.S. steel industry illustrates the problems of  considering 
an industry in apparent decline. The loss of market in the 1970s and 1980s by 
the large integrated producers has been characterized by the joint presence of 
a growth in import pressures, and consequent protection,  and the growth of 
a new lower-cost domestic  source of  supply based on minimill technology. 
Observers have characterized this industry  as a classic example of  Schum- 
peter’s creative destruction in market economies, with the new replacing the 
old. At the same time, others have been more concerned about lost jobs and 
output due to the dramatic decline of the traditional part of the industry, and 
steel is often listed as one of the key strategic industries any major world eco- 
nomic and military power must preserve. 
The simultaneous presence of an old and a new technology within the same 
industry and the importance of international competition in the U.S. steel mar- 
ket suggest that explicitly modeling the industry along the lines presented in 
the newer theories of international trade might be fruitful. While there are nu- 
merous sources of conventional microeconomic analysis of the U.S. steel in- 
dustry, there is little in the way of analysis based on the newer trade theories.’ 
This paper describes a calibrated imperfect-competition  model of the U.S. 
steel industry in the partial equilibrium tradition  of  Baldwin  and Krugman 
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I. Examples of  microeconomic analysis of  the  U.S. steel industry include Tam  and Morkre 
(1984). which uses the competitive industry model as the basic framework. 
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(1988) and Dixit (1988). The model in this paper is distinguished in a number 
of  ways, however, from those papers. First, the essential problem is one of 
dealing with the cost heterogeneity of firms within the steel industry due to the 
presence of old and new technologies. Second, the modeling of intertemporal 
competition is complicated by the small size and competitiveness of the U.S. 
minimill sector. The particular model used to address the nature of intertempo- 
ral competition  will undoubtedly  affect the results.  The model used  in this 
paper is one which might be summarized as mixed price-quantity competition 
during the “declining phase” of the industry, with a contestable-markets view 
of the longer term over which the industry may or may not be reborn as a high 
technologyhigh productivity industry. 
The model used in this paper is highly stylized. It considers a hypothetical 
10-year period in the industry, which could be imagined to be  1990-99.  The 
period is characterized by constant (nongrowing) demand, constant real factor 
prices, and constant foreign supply prices. Furthermore it is assumed that the 
1985 quotas, or voluntary export restraints (VERs), are in place over the entire 
10-year period. The five-year period of 1990-94  is assumed to be one of com- 
petition between the minimills and the remaining integrated producers on their 
old plants. At the  end of this  period,  it is assumed that existing integrated 
producers will exit the market completely, if  they have not already done so. 
The period  1995-99  is characterized as a period of industry rebirth in which 
minimills in the United States are the least-cost source of  domestic supply; 
however their success in that period will depend upon the nature of competi- 
tion and the degree to which they were able to get costs down during the first 
five years. 
The paper focuses on a basic descriptive model of the steel industry cali- 
brated to a 1985 data set, and then a number of alternative trade and industrial 
policy experiments are carried out. These include (a) relaxed VERs on steel 
imports  into the  U.S.  market,  (b)  increased protection  of  the  U.S. market, 
(c) subsidies to integrated producers, (d) subsidies on operating costs during 
set-up periods to minimills, (e) cartelization of the market by forced mergers 
of integrated producers and minimills resulting in forced technical efficiency 
within the industry, (f) rationalization  cartels with the additional constraint of 
price controls, and finally for reference  (g) a type of  second-best optimum 
taking the level of imports into the U.S. market as given. All of these represent 
elements of industry policy proposals that have come forward at one time or 
another for dealing with the peculiar problems of steel. 
The basic result of the simulations is rather striking. The cost of the current 
VER protection  is quite large, compared to either free trade or to a second- 
best optimum. For example in present-value terms the cost of protection over 
a 10-year period relative to a second-best optimum is approximately 6.85 per- 
cent of the present value of the base consumption stream, or about $4.6 billion 
(1985 dollars). The welfare  gains to complete elimination of  protection  on 
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small change in the level of quota protection is actually welfare reducing. The 
particular nature of  these results  is explored in some detail. It is surprising 
how sensitive to different policies the market shares of integrated and minimill 
producers are, and furthermore how sensitive cost inefficiencies within the in- 
dustry are, both to policies and to the degree of protection. Furthermore, the 
quantitative results are somewhat more significant than other calibrated strate- 
gic trade policy exercises, suggesting that the scope for strategic trade policy 
may be greater than heretofore imagined.2 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 provides the details 
of  the basic industry model used.  Section 6.3 provides a brief  summary of 
some salient features of the U.S. steel industry and details of the calibrations. 
Section 6.4 outlines the results of a variety of policy alternatives and the impact 
of partial trade reforms taking existing market structure as given. Section 6.5 
examines some sensitivity analyses by  considering issues of  labor rents in 
base-cost calculations, alternative calibration procedures, and the sensitivity to 
demand elasticities. Section 6.6 concludes with some comments on the inter- 
pretation of the results and difficulties with this particular model of the steel in- 
dustry. 
6.2  An Industry Model 
Many economists might think it is natural to use a competitive model to 
look at the U.S. steel industry. There are 14 large integrated steel producers 
using open-hearth furnaces and basic oxygen furnaces (BOFs), with many hav- 
ing moved to continous casting. As of  1986 there were about  55  minimill 
plants using electric furnaces and continuous casting, with scrap metal as the 
basic raw  material input. Minimills are about one-sixth the size of  an large 
integrated firm and typically produce a narrower product line. Minimill tech- 
nology has  been  changing, however, with what can be regarded  as classic 
industry- and firm-specific learning effects occuring within the industry A typ- 
ical start-up time is about two years for a minimill, and unit costs decline dra- 
matically during this period. Integrated producers are operating plants well in 
excess of 20 years old, and modernization of these processes is technologically 
infeasible without complete scrapping. Minimills have a 30 to 60 percent op- 
erating cost advantage over the integrated firms. New integrated plants have 
been built abroad, principally in Brazil, Germany, Korea, and Japan. Crandall 
(198 1) concluded that to build a new integrated plant in the United States was 
simply not economic at 1982 wages and exchange rates. 
2. This is a disturbing conclusion for economists,  who are prone to take noninterventionist 
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Thus competition within the U.S. market is between existing integrated pro- 
ducers, existing and new minimills coming on stream, and imports. Virtually 
all imports were under VER arrangements after 1983, and for most of the pe- 
riod  1983-88  the VERs were binding. For the purposes at hand it is assumed 
the import sector can be modeled simply as producing up to the level of  the 
VER. 
In constructing a model of  the U.S. steel industry there  are at least three 
reasons why imperfect competition may be a more appropriate paradigm than 
the static competitive model traditionally used. 
1. There is a long history of price-setting practices by the integrated produc- 
ers, resulting  in numerous instances of  policy confrontation in the industry. 
Oligopolistic pricing practices may be facilitated by the presence of a heavily 
unionized labor force within the industry.3 
2. Minimills, while small relative to the integrated producers, have techno- 
logies which are characterized by the presence of significant sunk and fixed 
costs to building a plant, as well as the presence of a short but steep learning 
curve within a given plant life. Accounting for either of these important tech- 
nological  characteristics  of  the industry  within  a competitive framework is 
close to impossible. 
3. Given the presence of the large competitors and the nature of their tech- 
nology, minimills must make strategic pricing decisions in light of present and 
future competition. At the same time, entry into the industry by a new minimill 
usually means a period of losses, followed by a period of profitability. Model- 
ing future industry output and price is an important determinant of minimill 
behavior within a framework in which equilibrium depends on producers’ ex- 
pectations of the future. 
6.2.1  Model Details 
The industry life consists of  two periods, each equal to five years, with a 
common private and social discount factor 6 connecting the two periods. Two 
important characteristics of  demand are relevant in the case of steel: no real 
growth in domestic demand and a fairly low price elasticity of demand (clearly 
less than one). It is also reasonable to assume that intertemporal substitution 
effects in the demand for steel are small. The demand structure in each of the 
two periods is therefore a linear inverse demand curve: 
P, = a -  PQ,,  i = 1, 2, 
where P, is the market price in period  i, and Q, is  total quantity  sold. The 
advantage of linear demand over iso-elastic demand curves in this case is obvi- 
ous, as it prevents industry revenues from becoming unbounded as output falls 
and provides a determinate solution to the monopoly pr~blem.~ 
3. See Crandall(1981, 31-32)  for a discussion of oligopolistic pricing in the U.S.  steel industry. 
4. An advantage of the linear demand structure over the iso-elastic is that we can consider the 
impact of monopolization on price and output, while calibrating the model to a base with a (abso- 
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Integrated producers, minimills, and importers produce perfect substitutes 
all selling at a common price in the domestic market. The level of  imports 
under an assumed binding VER is M in both periods. Integrated producers are 
assumed to be operating plants which collapse at the end of  the first period. 
They have excess capacity throughout the first period and operate with constant 
unit operating costs (marginal variable costs) of li dollars per unit output. Inte- 
grated producers' collective output in period l is denoted by x. If price is below 
v, integrated producers will shut down. Accounting profits, including charges 
against fixed capital, are typically negative for these firms, but this will play 
no role in the analysis. 
Minimill producers have an aggregated industry technology characterized 
by a fixed number of plants with fixed set-up cost, E  Costs in period 1 given 
an output y in period 1 are 
(2)  c,(y) = wy + F;  if y > 0; otherwise c, = 0. 
Costs in period 2 given an output level z in period 2 are 
(3)  c*(y,z) = uy-"z. 
The unit operating costs in period 2 are given by an iso-elastic learning func- 
tion m =  uy-", with a learning curve elasticity of  E >  0,  so unit costs in period 
2 decline as output in period 1 increases. While the learning curve interpreta- 
tion is popular, the elasticity can be nonzero for a number of reasons summa- 
rized simply as the value of experience. It will be assumed that the number of 
minimills is fixed; this implies that all have the same cost curves, and interpre- 
ting z and y as aggregate minimill output implies that the number of firms is 
buried implicitly in the constant term a in the aggregate cost f~nction.~ 
6.2.2  Period-1 Equilibrium 
In period 1 integrated producers and minimills take the supply of imports as 
given by the VER. They face a residual demand curve determining the quantity 
over which they compete. This quantity competition is treated as a duopoly 
between the two sectors with exogenous conjectural variations on the part of 
minimills and integrated producers. At this point it must be admitted that this 
is a clear case of heroic aggregation across two classes of firms, ignoring com- 
petition between firms of each group in the first period. A weak but not com- 
5. Suppose there are n identical minimills, each producing y =  y/n in the first period, and 6 in 
the second period. Each minimill has a second-period cost function S  (6) = by-%. Total costs to 
producing z =  n8 are 
which is the functional form used in equation (3). 
As y  is aggregate minimill output, E  could capture learning effects which spill over between 
firms within the minimill sector. However, the interpretation of the first-order conditions strictly 
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pletely  satisfactory answer to this  objection is that the number of  firms are 
implicitly  buried in the exogenous conjectural variation coefficient. Another 
unsatisfactory  defense, but one commonly used, is that there is within-group 
collusion but not across-group collusion. 
Let  +I  denote the conjecture of the integrated producers as to dQ,/dx, and 
+M  denote the minimill conjecture dQ,/dy. The first-order condition describing 
the integrated producers' reaction function is given by 
(4) 
In the case of the minimills one must take account of how current output af- 
fects future profits. Let z*  denote equilibrium output levels in period 2. By the 
envelope result, assuming the firm has chosen z*  such as to equate marginal 
revenue and marginal cost in period 2, period-1 output y must satisfy 
(5) 
The term  -say-"-'  represents the operating-cost  savings per unit of period-2 
output due to an additional unit of period- I output. 
The market share in the period- 1 equilibrium is critical in determining future 
minimill costs. Any policy or external shock which lowers the market share of 
integrated producers raises the future competitiveness of  minimills. As such, 
therefore, the determination of output between the two types of producers is 
of considerable private and social importance. 
A second characteristic of  this equilibrium is that we assume that w >  v; 
that is, that first-period operating costs of the minimill are higher than the vari- 
able costs of  the old plants in the integrated sector. This simply reflects the 
start-up costs of a new technology. At the same time it is expected that future 
operating costs in minimills, m, will be less than both v and w. 
The heterogeneity of costs across firm types means that, in general, the equi- 
librium of  this industry  will not be "technically  efficient";  that is, marginal 
costs of different firms will differ and total costs will not be minimized. In a 
simple static sense this is true, as w is not equal to v. In an intertemporal model, 
though, the definition of technical efficiency is complicated, as one must ac- 
count for the cost of producing future output. A standard definition of technical 
efficiency  would be an allocation of  outputs across plants which minimized 
the present-value cost of producing a given aggregate output stream. Solving 
this problem yields the cost efficiency condition 
(6)  v = w -  S&ay-"-'z*. 
This simply says that allocation of output between  new and old plants must 
account for the future cost savings as a result of  allocating additional output 
to new plants. Outcomes other than planning or monopoly solutions will not 
generally be technically efficient. A measure of technical inefficiency reported 
in the simulations is the percentage  difference in true cost between  old and 
new plants, expressed as a percentage of old plant operating costs, v.  Hence 
we define 
PI -  pxq =  v. 
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(7) 
[v -  (w -  s&ay-E-’Z*)] 
~~~  --  efficiency gap = 100 
V 
An approximate interpretation of the efficiency gap would be the percentage 
cost savings on a unit of output shifted from the integrated sector to the mini- 
mill sector.‘j 
It is generally acknowledged that the minimill sector is quite competitive. 
A central problem in this model is allowing for the presence of competitive 
pressures on price and entry in some appropriate way. It would seem desirable 
to enforce a zero present-value  condition on minimills, which by assumption 
are  assumed  to  start production  at  the  beginning  of  period  1 and  operate 
through the end of period 2. The traditional way  of enforcing the zero-profit 
condition is by changing the number of firms, but with firms ignoring the effect 
of their pricing behavior on the number of  firms in the industry. An extreme 
alternative is a type of contestable-markets model, where the number of firms 
is taken as fixed and pricing is such as to enforce zero profits. For a variety of 
reasons having to do with the availability of data, it seemed desirable to avoid 
the issue of how many minimills the U.S. market might accommodate. To do 
so requires detailed information about the cost curve at all levels of output. 
For this reason the contestable-markets view of future price competition was 
adopted. The basic idea is that price is set in period 2, conditional on output 
and price in period 1. The price is set such that second-period profits just cover 
first-period losses in present-value terms. Thus equilibrium  in  the  minimill 
segment of  the market is characterized by a zero present-value  constraint. As 
in the static contestable-markets theory, it is price that changes so as to ensure 
zero profits, not the number of firms. At the same time the price in the period- 
1 market game is set based on the calibrated conjectural variations. 
As another way of thinking about this equilibrium, imagine a minimill fore- 
casting future sales in the first period. One reasonable conjecture would be that 
output in any equilibrium would be sufficient to yield operating profits so that, 
over the course of  a plant’s life, a normal rate of return would be earned. The 
major problem with this equilibrium concept is that it suffers from problems 
of the usual ex post sort when open loop equilibria are used. When period 2 is 
reached, the price forecast may not be sustainable against some deviations in 
behavior by some fraction of the minimill sector. Price competition in particu- 
lar would be ruinous, forcing operating profits to zero and losses on the plants 
in the industry. 
One reasonable way out of this predicament is to assume that z corresponds 
to a long-run capacity level chosen in period 1, when the plant is set up. In the 
case of  minimills this  is not  an unreasonable  assumption,  given  that these 
plants  are designed with a particular level of output in mind. The period-2 
price is therefore stable against price cutting in the second period, as all firms 
6.  This interpretation is only approximate in this model however, as period-2 output, z*, might 
change in response to this experiment. In a simple static model with homogeneous output and 
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are capacity constrained. It must be assumed however that firms do not attempt 
to cut capacity in period 1 in an attempt to raise price. The contestable-markets 
story is that firms assume, were this to happen, that new minimills would enter, 
lowering price in both periods, and making the initial decision unprofitable. 
Without further justification we simply assume that output is set in period 2 
such as to force the present value of  the profit stream on a minimill to zero. 
Letting ni  denote period-i profits in a minimill, equilibrium implies that (x,y,z) 
satisfies the constraint that 
n,  + 6 n2  = 0. 
Equation (8) provides the link connecting periods  I  and 2. Any change re- 
sulting in an increase in period- 1 operating losses-say,  due to an increase in 
fixed plant costs, F-will  result in a corresponding increase in n2,  meaning 
usually lower period-2 output and higher period-2 prices. Note the structure of 
the model: an increase in F has no effect on period-1 prices. There are a num- 
ber of other interesting linkages induced by the zero present-value condition. 
For example, a relaxation of the VERs will reduce the profitability of both the 
minimill and integrated sector in period- 1 competition. Holding second-period 
imports constant, this will result in higher prices in the second period as min- 
imills attempt to recoup their higher losses in the second period. Policy instru- 
ments therefore result in an intertemporal shifting of consumer and producer 
surplus through the profitability constraint on the minimill sector. 
6.2.3  The Second-Best Problem 
We report the solution to the second-best problem of maximizing consumer 
surplus plus domestic producer surplus, taking the level of the quota as given. 
This  asks  how  a  planner  would  organize  the  industry  in  the  aggregate 
efficiency-maximizing way, taking as the second-best constraint the level of 
imports into the market. Because quota rents are assumed to accrue to foreign- 
ers, a feature of  the second-best solution is that domestic output is used as 
a tool to lower prices and thus transfer surplus from foreigners to domestic 
consumers. For example, consider the simple problem in a constant-cost indus- 
try, with domestic cost c and foreign costs c*. If the inverse demand curve is 
D(Q),  the  exogenous  quota level is q+, and  domestic production  is x, the 
second-best problem is 
max W =  S(q+ + x) -  cx -  D(q+ + x)q+, 
where S(Q)  is the gross domestic surplus function. Letting P denote the con- 
sumer price in the solution to this problem, generally P will be below c,  and 
in fact P satisfies the first-order condition 
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where m is the import share and q is the absolute price elasticity of demand. 
Implicitly, c -  P can be thought of as a production subsidy. With q = 1  .O  and 
m = 0.25, the subsidy is 25 percent of selling price. The solution must satisfy 
the constraint that p 2  c*,  otherwise foreigners would not  supply q+ to the 
domestic market. It is possible that a corner solution, P =  c*, is optimal, with 
an implicit production subsidy of s =  c -  c*. 
The quota-revenue function R(q+,x)  = D(q+  + x)q+ is globally decreasing in 
x. Note however that holding x constant, 
From the perspective of piecemeal reform of the quota levels, it is possible that 
increasing the allowable imports (increasing 4’)  is locally welfare decreasing 
if aRlaq+ >  0 or m/q < 1. If x is chosen optimally in (9) then, by the envelope 
theorem, dW/dq+ = -D‘(q+ + x)q+ >  0, so in this case the effect on welfare is 
unambiguous, with an increase in the quota leading to an increase in welfare. 
However in the model used here, x set in a market equilibrium will not be a 
solution to (9). 
6.4  Calibration 
The model was chosen with the U.S. steel industry in mind, over a hypotheti- 
cal 10-year period using 1985 data on costs, growth, and the like, as the bench- 
mark. For the sake of  concreteness the  10-year period is referred to as the 
decade of the 1990s. It was desirable to break this decade into two periods: a 
period of competition between minimills and existing integrated producers and 
a period in which integrated producers retire their plants and competition is 
between  minimills and  imports. Taking  10 years  as  a  horizon  beginning 
in  1990, we  chose the period  1990-94  as the period of  integrated/minimill 
competition. The period  1995-99  is taken as the period in which domestic 
minimills are the sole U.S. source of steel. Rather than building a model with 
10 separate periods, a drastic simplification was adopted whereby “period 1” 
is thought of  as a sequence of  five years of  identical price, output, and the 
like, and “period 2” is a sequence of five years of  identical price and output. 
Aggregation across time is done simply by weighting each year appropriately 
given an interest rate. Thus the model’s period-2 “weight” reflects a ratio of 
summed discount factors over years allocated to periods 1 and 2 respectively. 
Using a real interest rate of 8 percent the weight on period 2 is 0.68. Interpreted 
properly this means a $1 cash flow each year from 1995 to 1999 is worth 0.68 
of a sequence of $1 cash receipts in each of the years 1990 to 1994 valued in 
1990 dollars. While clearly simplifying the dynamics of the problem, the two- 
period model captures much of the essence of the problem and allows calibra- 
tion of the model to otherwise “static” data. 
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ticity in this paper from Crandall (1981) is taken at -0.90. The low price elas- 
ticities reflect the presence of  few good short-term substitutes, plus a demand 
curve which has been shrinking to the left. The inelasticity of demand means 
that efforts to increase output result in large price decreases, giving additional 
reasons for efforts by the industry to restrict output, or at least avoid output in- 
creases. 
The rest of the parameters for the model are taken from the books by Cran- 
dall (1981), Barnett and Schorsch (1983), and Barnett and Crandall (1986). 
While there are no formal models in these books, they each take a fairly similar 
view of demand, costs, and future technology from the perspective of the first 
half of the 1980s. As of 1989 the major factor not accounted for in these books 
was the fall in the value of the U.S. dollar from 1985 to 1988. This has led to 
foreign supply prices in terms of U.S. dollars which are higher than those used 
in this paper. It should be emphasized that the purpose of this paper is not to 
offer realistic “forecasts” of the steel industry but rather to highlight the prob- 
lems of a declining, internationally noncompetitive industry within a partial- 
equilibrium framework. High domestic costs could be due to a variety of rea- 
sons including an overvalued exchange rate. 
The facts on the state of the industry in the mid- 1980s are fairly indisput- 
able, although engineering estimates of costs are always subject to some dis- 
agreement. As of the mid-1980s the U.S. market for carbon steel products was 
about 94 million tons per year. Barnett and Crandall(l986,96-98)  suggested 
that  at current  rates of  economic growth, this  demand would  remain  about 
constant over the 1990s. In 1985 dollars the current price was in the range of 
$430 to $440 per ton. Imports accounted for about 25 percent of the U.S. mar- 
ket, with most of those imports covered by a VER agreement. The supply price 
of foreign imports depended on the country supplying, the method of produc- 
tion, and of course the exchange rate. The lowest cost source of imports was 
probably Korea, coming in at about $270 per ton using a 1985 exchange rate. 
These may obviously have changed but for the moment we will assume these 
costs remained constant. Given that the trade policy instrument of choice has 
been VERs, we will assume that all quota rents accrued to non-U.S.  residents. 
Note that because of this, from a social point of view policies which indirectly 
shift quota rents may be nationally beneficial. 
Integrated  U.S.  producers  (about  14 firms) had mid-1980s  unit operating 
costs of about $403 per ton (1985 dollars). All of the sources cited above agree 
that new greenfield integrated plants, with a minimum efficient scale (MES) 
of around 4 million tons per year, were not competitive in the United States at 
existing prices. As far as the integrated sector goes, therefore, the central ques- 
tion is when it will be displaced, and, until then, how large a market it might 
get in the absence of draconian government intervention. 
Minimills constitute the new  competitive  and growing  sector of the US. 
steel industry. Thus far they have operated on a much smaller scale than the 
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growing rapidly from about 15 percent of  the US. market in the early 1980s 
to a projected  27  percent  in  1989. This sector remains very dynamic, with 
technology changing  both  in  terms of  increased productivity  and changing 
scale. Some observers feel that efficient scale is growing within the minimill 
sector, and some consolidation is likely to take place. Engineering studies pro- 
vide two important numbers on minimill technology: best-practice operating 
costs (at around $3  11 per ton) and the fixed costs of building a minimill plant.’ 
Some of these studies also argue that the plant life of a minimill, in the range 
of  10 years, is significantly shorter than that of an integrated facility. This pro- 
vides some justification for focusing on a 10-year horizon in the model. 
The literature is not as helpful at providing information on the intertemporal 
structure of costs in the minimill  sector, which are an important point in this 
exercise. First, an estimate of the operating costs in the early life of the repre- 
sentative plant is necessary, including start-up costs. While there are numerous 
qualitative  stones about these costs, I have not found any precise estimates. 
Using the well-known “10 percent” rule, therefore, it is assumed that operating 
costs in new minimills, inclusive of  start-up costs, are  10 percent above the 
operating cost found in existing integrated facilities. From the static perspec- 
tive of  near-term  supply, this means that the existing integrated facilities are 
the least-cost source of domestic supply. 
The  second  important  parameter  describing  minimill  technology  is  the 
“learning elasticity,”  E. While the general  literature on learning gives ranges 
for this parameter from 0.10 to 0.40,  they differ by product and length of prod- 
uct cycle. It  seems that a modest estimate for this parameter  value is 0.15, 
meaning a one percent increase in output over the first five years of the plant 
reduces future operating costs by 0.15 percent. The cost function parameter, a 
(the constant in the learning curve), is then calibrated such that at the observed 
level of  minimill output the best-practice operating cost of  $311 per  ton  is 
reached after five years of plant operation. 
This calibration is summarized in table 6.1. The observed price-cost margins 
and market shares are used to calibrate the reaction coefficients $’ and $M.  In 
the case of minimills one must also infer the zero present-value output level in 
period 2; this turns out to be about 72 million tons. It is interesting that the 
value for both reaction coefficients are fairly close to zero, implying that pric- 
ing is a long way from Cournot duopoly, reflecting competition both with and 
between the integrated and minimill sectors of the market. The calibrated val- 
ues of the reaction coefficients suggest the minimill sector is the least aggres- 
sive, and the integrated  sector the most aggressive, in terms of price cutting. 
This is partially consistent with the evidence of substantial excess capacity in 
the integrated sector, forcing integrated producers to price close to marginal 
variable cost as a means of maintaining output. At the same time the minimill 
sector is also fairly competitive, but it still suffers significant losses in the first 
7. The engineering literature is surveyed by Barnett and Crandall (1986, chap. 5). 142  Richard G.  Harris 
Table 6.1  Parameters and Data for Calibrated Intertemporal Model of US. 
Steel Market, 1990-95 
Parameter  Data 
Average annual U.S.  consumption 
Base price (1985 $) 
Price elasticity of demand 
Import share of market under VER's (%) 
Integrated producer share of market (%) 
Minimill share of market (%) 
Integrated average annual operating cost 
Foreign least-cost supply (Korea) price 
Minimill fixed costs (hundred million $) 
Minimill intertemporal cost elasticity 
Minimill five-year target operating cost at existing 
Discount factor on  1995-99  period 
Calibrated reaction coefficients for period- 1 market structure: 
Integrated producer 
Minimills  dQJdy  = 0.04508 
output rates 
dQddx = +' = 0.006553 
94 million tons 
$435 per ton 




$403 per ton 
$270 per ton 
22.08 
E = 0.15 
$3  11 per ton 
0.68 (or 8% real interest rate) 
five years as prices are not sufficient to cover operating and fixed costs. The 
low operating costs in the second half-life of the plant, however, provide profits 
sufficient to ensure the present-value constraint is satisfied. It should be noted 
that in both periods the domestic price is sufficiently above the foreign supply 
price to ensure the VERs are binding and are giving rise to positive quota rents 
in equilibrium. 
6.5  Simulation Results 
In this section a number of alternative simulations are presented, which are 
designed to shed light on the current state of the industry and policies which 
have been recommended from time to time to deal with the steel industry. A 
summary of these results are presented in table 6.2. Eight different simulations 
are reported and discussed below. 
6.5.1  The Second-Best maximum 
For a point of  reference it was decided to calculate a second-best optimum, 
maximizing consumer surplus plus producer surplus subject to the constraint 
that the quota, or level of imports, be taken as given and prices are bounded 
from below by foreign supply prices. What is interesting about the solution to 
this second-best problem is that prices are close to the foreign supply prices, 
quota rents are negligible, and the minimill market share is quite large relative 
to all other equilibria, with one exception. The fact that prices are driven below 
domestic production costs in both sectors reflects the second-best nature of the Table 6.2  Alternative Policy Simulations for US.  Steel Industry, 1990-99  (CV calibration method; high demand elasticity) 
Status  VERs  VERs 
Quo  Relaxed  Tightened 
Price 1 (hundred $ per ton)  4.35  4.25  4.42 
Price 2 (hundred $ per ton)  3.52  3.93  3.38 
Minimill output  1 (million  25.42  19.27  28.48 
Integrated output 1 (million  45.08  29.83  54.78 
Minimill output 2 (million  86.67  55.26  103.57 
Quota level (million tons per  23.50  47.00  9.40 
Minimill unit cost 2  3.11  3.24  3.06 
Welfare 1 (billion 1985 $)  2.1739  2.1798  2.1956 
Welfare cost”  (%)  32.88  36.71  31.27 
Efficiency gapb  (%)  16.90  13.59  18.20 
Integrated producer surplus  .I462  .0646  ,2154 
Quota rentsc (billion 1985 $)  S203  1.1199  ,2054 
tons, per annum) 
tons per annum) 
tons per annum) 
annum) 
(hundred $ per ton) 
Welfare 2 (billion 1985 $)  3.4744  3.0658  3.6097 






























Integrated  Minimill  Second-Best 
Subsidies  Subsidies  Maximum 
3.69  4.28  2.83 
4.33  2.85  2.7 1 
18.04  38.21  70.08 
65.34  33.83  30.15 
7 1.07  99.85  102.43 
23.50  23.50  23.50 
3.27  2.92  2.6i 
2.3576  2.1459  2.2223 
3.1966  3.8271  4.1159 
32.95  29.89  26.03 
22.70  9.41  0.00 
,3060  ,0830  -.3629 
,4929  ,3935  .03 18 
Note: “Price 1” refers to annual price in period 1 (years 1-5).  “price 2” refers to annual price in period 2 (years 6-10),  etc. 
“Welfare  cost is measured as 
present value of free-trade welfare -  present value of actual welfare 
present value of benchmark consumption 
bEfficiency  gap is eq. (7) expressed as a percentage 
.Quota  rents are the present value of quota rents over both periods. 144  Richard G.  Harris 
problem, with quota revenues being distributed abroad as discussed in section 
6.3. Clearly in period  1 of the second-best  optimum, given a price of  $271 
per ton, steel producers  are receiving a substantial subsidy. Domestic output 
becomes  an instrument whereby the quota rents on imports are reduced, re- 
sulting in welfare gains to the domestic economy in the absence of other instru- 
ments to reduce the quota rent transfer. The justification for using this particu- 
lar second-best optimum as a reference point is motivated by the observation 
that free trade in steel is probably irrelevant as a domestic policy objective; the 
best that can be hoped for is to maximize efficiency within the domestic indus- 
try taking as given the level of imports, and in this case the policy that ensures 
that level of imports is met-the  VER. Obviously tariffs are welfare-superior 
to VERs, but they are presumed to be unavailable as a policy tool. 
Another characteristic of the second-best optimum is that the technical effi- 
ciency gap, as defined in equation (7),  is zero, meaning the present-value costs 
of total domestic production are being minimized, or equivalently that the out- 
put allocation in the solution is technically efficient. 
Welfare cost is measured relative to a free-trade equilibrium  in which the 
equilibrium price is $270 per ton in both periods and imports have 100 percent 
of the U.S. market. Thus the welfare loss of the second-best  maximum  ex- 
pressed as a percentage of the present value of consumption in the status quo, 
or benchmark, is 26 percent. From a pure efficiency point of view, free trade 
is vastly superior to any of the alternative equilibria considered. 
6.5.2  The Status Quo 
The status quo is basically  the benchmark  data set with  slight changes.* 
There are at least two important observations about this equilibrium. First, in 
the status quo there are much higher prices and positive profits on integrated 
producer capacity, while in the second-best equilibrium the integrated produc- 
ers actually operate at a loss. In a true first-best equilibrium the latter would 
never occur, but in this framework the presence of transfers to foreigners means 
that domestic output is used as a device to lower prices and hence the transfers. 
Second, it is noteworthy that the allocation of output across sectors is quite 
different than  in the second-best  optimum. The share of  minimill  output in 
total domestic output is considerably greater in the second-best optimum than 
in the status quo. Indeed market shares are almost exactly reversed across the 
two equilibria. The cost efficiency gap in the status quo is a reflection of  this 
difference; at 16.9 percent the efficiency gap indicates too much period-1 out- 
put is allocated to old plants in the integrated sector. Interpreting the welfare 
results requires some caution. The welfare cost number is the welfare loss rela- 
tive to free trade expressed as a percentage of the present value of the status 
8. The benchmark consists of an average of  data over the first half of the 1980s expressed as a 
“typical” year. The model has two periods  which differ. The calibration process  is such that 
second-period price and output may differ from the benchmark first-period price and output. 145  Trade and Industrial Policy for a “Declining” Industry 
quo consumption stream. This number can be quite sensitive to the assumed 
foreign supply price. In any case the welfare cost of any of these simulations 
as compared to free trade is substantial. At a welfare cost of 32.88 percent, the 
existing structure of protection and industry organization results in very large 
welfare costs. However, as remarked earlier, free trade may not be the relevant 
basis for comparison. Compared to the second-best outcome, which takes the 
level of imports and protection in the form of quotas as given, the status quo 
situation is only 6.85 percent worse than the second-best. This number might 
be interpreted as the impact of inefficiently allocated market resources, given 
the existence of an institutionally constrained level of protection. We shall re- 
turn to this point later. It is also noteworthy  that the  second-best allocation 
relative to the market allocation shifts welfare intertemporally toward the sec- 
ond period. This suggests that the status quo market allocation, which is “bi- 
ased‘’ against the minimill sector’s output, tends to result in an intertemporal 
distortion as well, shifting consumer surplus toward the current period at the 
expense of the future period. 
6.5.3  Partial Trade Liberalization 
A natural question is to ask what marginal value the VERs might have in 
maintaining domestic output, and what welfare benefits or costs they induce. 
The simulation “VERs relaxed”  looks at the effect of  doubling the level of 
allowable imports in both periods on the equilibrium of  the model. This has 
the effect on consumers of reducing period- 1 price and raising period-2 price, 
reflecting the significantly reduced output of the minimill sector in period  1 
and thus reduced period- 1 profitability. Relative to the status quo, integrated 
firms’ output falls by about 33 percent and minimill output by about 24 per- 
cent. Also, not surprisingly, integrated producer surplus falls sharply with the 
output reduction and import expansion. What is a little surprising is that quota 
rents actually rise as a result of the increase in allowable imports. The quota- 
revenue function is actually increasing in the level of imports around the ob- 
served equilibrium. Relaxing the VERs actually reduces welfare both because 
period-2 prices are forced up and because quota rents more than double. The 
increase in welfare cost to doubling the allowable imports is about 4.8 percent 
(as a percentage of the base stream of  consumption).  Quantitatively  this is 
fairly significant and at the same time suggests that a movement toward free 
trade can be nationally  welfare decreasing. This conclusion is explored fur- 
ther below. 
6.5.4  Increased Protection 
If trade liberalization will not work, what about enhanced protection? The 
“VERs tightened” column in table 6.2 reports the effect of reducing the level 
of imports under a VER tightened to ten percent of the total market (base). In 
this case the domestic price rises in period  1, but falls in period 2, although 
not by  a great amount. Consumers on balance are worse off, not surprisingly. 146  Richard G. Harris 
Protection does little for the minimill sector; most of the output gains due to 
the increased size of the domestic market accrue to the integrated producers in 
period  1, although the minimill sector obviously expands output in period 2 
and produces at a lower cost relative to the benchmark equilibrium. There are 
some small welfare gains from this policy, about 1.6  percent, but hardly large 
enough to suggest that protection is the cure-all for the industry. From a techni- 
cal efficiency perspective, increased protection actually reduces the cost effi- 
ciency of the industry, by shifting output toward the integrated sector. 
6.5.5  Monopolization 
In the course of  the steel industry’s history it has occasionally been  sug- 
gested that, by cartelizing the industry, the efficient rationalization  of existing 
resources in the industry and restructuring  might be promoted. The Japanese 
model of a recessionary cartel is often cited. Given that a multiplant monopo- 
list would act as a true joint-profit maximizer, this certainly makes sense. How- 
e‘ier,  the consequences  for consumer welfare of this policy are bound to be 
detrimental, and in the presence of VERs might be extremely harmful from a 
national efficiency perspective. The “monopoly” column in table 6.2 bears this 
out. Welfare costs are an astounding 53 percent, explainable in large part by 
the low initial price elasticity of demand. A significant fraction of these losses 
are caused by transferring surplus to foreigners through the quota rents gener- 
ated by higher prices. The dramatic price increases experienced under this pol- 
icy obviously make it politically  unacceptable  as an industrial policy. Note 
that, as theory predicts, monopoly results in a cost-efficient industry with an 
efficiency gap of zero percent. 
6.5.6  Rationalization Cartels 
The stories about rationalization cartels one reads in the industrial policy 
literature seem to imply that a monopolist could rationalize and restructure the 
industry, but at the same time, some other policy tool would be used to keep 
prices low. It is not clear what model of industry one has in mind here. A public 
steel monopoly maximizing aggregate welfare subject to a budget constraint 
might be one model. A more practical  model, however, might simply be  a 
monopolist maximizing profits subject to price constraints. Such a policy sim- 
ulation is reported in the “rationalization cartel” column. Prices are constrained 
in this equilibrium not to exceed 4.36, reflecting the use of the status quo equi- 
librium price as a reference point. The results are quite interesting. The ratio- 
nalization process involves an expansion of minimill sector output and a con- 
traction  in  integrated  sector output relative  to the  status quo. Unit  costs in 
period 2 in the minimill sector are 10 percent lower under this policy than in 
the status quo. This result, together with the second-best results clearly suggest 
that in the status quo equilibrium  minimill output is being crowded out by 
integrated sector output relative to the “efficient” policy. Under the rationaliza- 
tion cartel policy, first-period minimill sector output more than doubles, going 
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Whatever the technical efficiency gains from a rationalization cartel is does 
not rank high in terms of  total welfare. There are fairly significant welfare 
losses under this model. The cartel attempts to make profits on the minimill 
sector, exploiting the relatively generous price constraint available in the sec- 
ond period. To do this it cuts back on the integrated sector output in the first 
period; this is welfare reducing because price exceeds marginal cost of produc- 
tion in integrated plants.  In period  2 there is a transfer from consumers to 
the cartel. 
6.5.7  Subsidies to Integrated Producers 
A policy often suggested is to subsidize the costs of  declining industries 
presumably with the objective of preserving output and jobs. In this case we 
focus on subsidies equal to 20 percent of operating costs, best thought of as a 
wage subsidy. The policy more or less produces the intended results; integrated 
sector output with a 20 percent operating subsidy expands by about 20 million 
tons relative to the status quo and price is reduced in period 1. The intertempo- 
ral linkage through the zero present-value condition shows up clearly. In the 
second period price rises by about 12 percent, reversing the pattern of declin- 
ing prices over time evident in the status quo. The net welfare effect is positive 
relative to the status quo, although very small. The benefit seems to come 
largely from the fact that price is closer to the marginal cost of integrated pro- 
ducers in period 1. Intertemporally the policy shifts welfare from period-2 to 
period- 1 consumer and producer surplus. 
6.5.8  Subsidies to Minimills 
The infant industry argument might suggest that because the minimill sector 
is “too small” relative to the second-best optimum it should be subsidized. As 
it turns out, a 20 percent operating subsidy to minimills results in about a 50 
percent increase in output in this sector, with the major benefit in form of re- 
duced prices in the second period. The subsidy which is offered during the 
industry’s first five years has the effect of also reducing integrated sector output 
by about 25 percent and produces net welfare gains of about 2.9 percent. While 
not insignificant, the quantitative gains might be reduced if one were to attach 
a deadweight loss to the additional tax revenue required by subsidies. 
6.5.9  Trade Reforms Again 
The results on trade reform do not at this point seem clear. In particular the 
large welfare costs in the status quo-free  trade comparison do not seem to 
reconcile with the welfare decrease of more generous VERs against steel im- 
ports. In figures 6.1-6.3  we present the results of varying the quota level from 
0 to 48 million tons into the market in both periods. Results are presented so 
as to set the welfare gain equal to zero in the status quo situation of a VER of 
23.5 million tons. 
Figure 6.1 presents the apparently “paradoxical” results that as the quota is 148  Richard G. Harris 
0  9,40  18,OO  23.50  30,OO  38,OO  48,OO 
VER  LEVEL 
Fig. 6.1  Protection and welfare: U.S. steel industry 
reduced the welfare gain is positive,  rising to a high of 2.8 percent when all 
imports are excluded from the market, while there is a welfare loss of 4.2 per- 
cent when imports are about half the domestic market. The apparent conclu- 
sion is that, on a partial reform basis, over a fairly wide range of import pene- 
tration levels, the optimal trade policy is to restrict imports of steel. 
This would be an erroneous conclusion, however. The real problem has to 
do with the use of an inefficient instrument, the VER; in this case the policy 
choice is driven by  the issue of shifting the implicit terms of trade between 
U.S. and foreign steel suppliers because rents accrue to non-U.S.  residents. 
Suppose an instrument were available such as a tariff or quota auctions such 
that all quota rents accrued to the U.S. economy in lump-sum fashion. The 
estimated impact on welfare is dramatically  different as illustrated in figure 
6.2. Using a quota-rent-inclusive measure of  welfare we see that the conclu- 
sions about protection are actually reversed. Prohibiting imports results in a 
welfare loss of about 5 per~ent,~  while progressive liberalization of the market 
by allowing increased imports increases welfare continuously. Neither welfare 
gains nor welfare costs to significant trade reform are trivial. They are all sub- 
stantially  in  excess  of  the  usual  1  percent gains in  much  of  the  partial- 
equilibrium strategic trade literature. Figure 6.3 illustrates the perverse effect 
protection has on industry cost efficiency. Restricted levels of quota protection 
raises the efficiency gap between integrated and minimill producers, contribut- 
ing to the usual welfare losses imposed by protection. 
It is important to emphasize that the paradoxical results on partial trade re- 
9. Note that the base is redefined in  this situation to be one in  which the rents on the 23.5 
million tons of imports accrue to US.  residents. 149  Trade and Industrial Policy for a “Declining” Industry 
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0  9.40  18,OO  23,50  30,OO  38,OO  48,OO 
VER  LEVEL 
Fig. 6.2  Quota-rent-inclusive welfare change: US.  steel market 
0  9,40  18,OO  23,50  30,OO  38,OO  48.00 
VER  LEVEL 
Fig. 6.3  Protection and technical inefficiency: U.S. steel industry 
form  are closely  linked  to  the  assumption  of  imperfect  competition. In  a 
perfect-competition model increasing the level of allowable imports, given a 
constant foreign supply price which is less than the domestic price, is always 
welfare  nondecreasing.  With imperfect competition there  are  a number of 
complications: (i) Price exceeds marginal cost in domestic production. By in- 
creasing imports and reducing domestic production the cost of this distortion 
is enhanced. (ii) In the competitive model, relaxing the VER would reduce 
price,  increase  total  output,  and  leave costs  unchanged.  In  the  imperfect- 
competition model of this paper, the learning-cost effect in the minimill sector 150  Richard G. Harris 
implies that a relaxed VER reduces current minimill output and thus raises 
future minimill cost and hence price. Therefore it is the interaction between 
the joint  assumptions  of  a  rent-transferring  voluntary  restraint  agreement 
(VRA) and an imperfect market structure which  leads to the possibility  that 
tighter quotas could be welfare increasing. 
What can we conclude from this exercise? There are three points to make: 
1. In the presence of VERs on which foreigners are collecting rents, partial 
trade reforms involving changes in the level of quotas must be carefully consid- 
ered. Partial liberalization may well be nationally harmful. 
2. Industrial subsidy policies targeted to particular  subsectors can have a 
substantial effect on the allocation of output between the subsectors. In gen- 
eral, subsidies to the new technology in this framework are appropriate, al- 
though the welfare gains would be enhanced were other instruments available 
to solve the quota-rent transfer problem. 
3.  Trying to correct the technical efficiency losses by rationalizing integrated 
capacity and shifting output toward the new technology part of the industry is 
of dubious quantitative significance within this model, at least over the range 
of parameter values considered. Given the possible cartelizing side effects of 
such policies one would want to proceed very carefully. 
6.6  Alternative Specifications and Procedures 
Tables 6.3-6.5  report some alternatives to the exercise reported in the last 
section. In many calibration exercises the empirical aspect of the procedures 
adopted are never clear-cut.I0 In the steel industry the cost figures in the inte- 
grated sector are particularly suspect because of a rather high wage differential 
of about 20 percent between it and average manufacturing in the United States. 
If this wage differential reflects rents to labor, and not differences in the oppor- 
tunity cost of labor in alternative sectors, the results could be seriously mis- 
specified. In table 6.3 we report  the same policy exercises assuming such a 
distortion in labor markets. Standard theory suggests that the integrated sector 
may be too small due to the presence of  the wage premium to employment 
in the integrated steel sector. Assuming that these rents exist implies that the 
integrated sector would have a much greater output in the second-best equilib- 
rium than in the status quo, reversing the “no-rent’’ simulation result. The ag- 
gregate welfare cost of the status quo measured against the second-best is 7.8 
percent-about  1 percent more than in the calibration without labor rents. The 
other notable distinguishing feature of these simulations is that the efficiency 
gap is much less than in the simulations without labor rents. In this instance 
the issue of output allocation across plants within the steel sector is less serious 
than in the previous case, as integrated producers are actually lower cost than 
10. See the discussion of this issue in Hams (1988, chap. 4) Table 6.3  Alternative Policy Simulations for U.S. Steel Industry, 199@99 (CV calibration method; labor rents = 20% of wage bill in integrated 
sector; high demand elasticity) 
Price 1 (hundred $ per ton) 
Price 2 (hundred $ per ton) 
Minimill output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Integrated output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Minimill output 2 (million 
tons per annum) 
Quota level (million tons per 
annum) 
Minimill unit cost 2 
(hundred $ per ton) 
Welfare 1 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare 2 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare costa (%) 
Efficiency gapb (%) 
Integrated producer surplus 
(billion 1985 $) 
Quota rentsc (billion 1985 $) 
Status  VERs  VERs  Rationalization 
QUO  Relaxed  Tightened  Monopoly  Cartel 
4.35  4.25  4.42  5.83  4.28 
3.52  3.93  3.38  5.60  4.35 
25.41  19.27  28.49  19.98  30.20 
45.08  29.83  54.78  21.37  41.71 
86.67  55.26  103.57  46.21  70.57 
23.50  47.00  9.40  23.50  23.50 
3.11  3.24  3.05  3.22  3.02 
2.3362  2.2872  2.3928  1.6261  1.1790 
3.4744  3.0657  3.6096  2.3472  3.2034 
32.21  37.07  30.01  54.17  52.16 
8.76  5.12  10.17  0.01  -1.04 
,1465  .0646  ,2153  ,3930  .lo51 
,5205  1.1199  .2054  1.1987  .6356 
Integrated  Minimill 
Subsidies  Subsidies 
Second-Best 
Maximum 
3.69  4.28 
3.94  2.85 
18.04  38.21 
65.34  33.83 
78.51  99.85 
23.50  23.50 
3.27  2.92 
2.5929  2.2676 
3.1965  3.8271 
31.21  29.67 
18.87  0.53 
.3060  .0830 














Note: See note to table 6.2. 
'Welfare  cost is measured as 
present value of free-trade welfare -  present value of actual welfare 
present value of benchmark consumption 
bEfficiency  gap is eq. (7) expressed as a percentage. 
'Quota  rents are the present value of quota rents over both periods. 152  Richard G. Harris 
they  appear  to  be  in  the  market  allocation,  which  is  biased  against  the 
minimills. 
One of the key problems in the calibration  of  the model is the use of  the 
conjectural variations as the “free parameter.” Numerous commentators have 
remarked as to the possible misspecifications  this may impose on the model. 
An alternative in the case of minimills is to assume the sector as a whole acts 
as a Bertrand-pricing oligopolist. Given the fairly large number of  minimills 
relative to integrated producers, this may be appropriate. In table 6.4  the results 
are based on the model in which the period-1 operating costs, w,  of minimills 
are calibrated assuming Bertrand pricing by minimills. In this model that cali- 
bration produces a cost estimate for w of 5.12, which is greater than the 4.43 
estimate used in the previous case. This change in calibration procedure now 
means both (a) that operating costs are higher in the minimill sector than the 
first set of simulations reported and (b) that pricing by the minimill producers 
is more competitive. This tends to put the integrated producers at a disadvan- 
tage in that their rivals are pursuing a more aggressive output strategy, but also 
at an advantage given the now-higher minimill costs. 
The results of the Bertrand minimill pricing are that the welfare losses are 
about 8.7 percent relative to the second-best-certainly  larger than in the first 
set of simulations. As in the last case however the conclusions about the rela- 
tive share of the two sectors in an efficient allocation is reversed. In the second- 
best equilibrium the minimill  sector is much smaller than in the first set of 
simulations. Indeed you will note that the efficiency gap has actually changed 
sign. As a result, subsidization of the minimills results in quite significant wel- 
fare losses relative to the status quo. 
One parameter value which seems of some dispute in the case of steel is the 
demand elasticity. Some estimates come in much lower than -0.90.  Jondrow 
(1978), for example, estimates it to be in the range of  -0.45-half  the  as- 
sumed value. Low demand elasticities are an important part of the problems 
plaguing declining industries, so it was thought to be a useful exercise to see 
how  conclusions changed  if  a much lower demand elasticity was assumed. 
These results are reported in table 6.5, again employing the conjectural varia- 
tions calibration method. Obviously with lower demand elasticities prices are 
much more sensitive to output changes around the benchmark. This shows up 
dramatically in the “monopoly” column of table 6.5 with a period-1 monopoly 
price of  43! Clearly the linear demand specification  is suspect at this point. 
The welfare costs of trade restrictions are of course dramatic given the steep 
demand curve and the redistributive implication of a VER. The status quo is 
characterized by a welfare loss of  99 percent relative to free trade; however 
relative to the second-best equilibrium the welfare loss is only about 8.5 per- 
cent. The other qualitative conclusions do not change much. Table 6.4  Alternative Policy Simulations for US.  Steel Industry, 1990-99 (cost calibration method; Bertrand minimill pricing) 
status 
QUO 
VERs  VERs 
Relaxed  Tightened 
4.31  4.40 
5.52  3.80 
Rationalization  Integrated  Minimill 
Cartel  Subsidies  Subsidies 
Second-Best 
Maximum  Monopoly 
Price 1 (hundred $ per ton) 
Price 2 (hundred $ per ton) 
Minimill output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Integrated output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Minimill output 2 (million 
tons per annum) 
Quota level (million tons per 
annum) 
Minimill unit cost 2 
(hundred $ per ton) 
Welfare 1 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare 2 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare costa (9%) 
Efficiency gapb  (%) 
Integrated producer surplus 
(billion 1985 $) 













25.50  8.96  31.94  9.5 1  16.09  15.15  78.39  20.32 
45.01  38.88  5 1.74  32.35  55.53  67.88  0.00  82.16 
77.43  24.34  95.38  42.53  70.50  71.07  89.30  102.53 





-  18.52 
3.63  3.00 
1.6805  2.1464 
1.7655  3.5765 
58.30  33.46 




























,1093  ,1923 











Note: See note to table 6.2 
"Welfare cost is measured as 
present value of free-trade welfare -  present value of actual welfare 
present value of benchmark consumption 
100 x 
bEfficiency  gap is eq. (7) expressed as a percentage. 
.Quota rents are the present value of quota rents over both periods. Table 6.5  Alternative Policy Simulations for U.S.  Steel Industry, 1990-99  (CV calibration; low demand elasticity) 
~  ~  ~  ~  ~~ 
Status  VERs  VERs  Rationalization  Integrated  Minimill  Second-Best 
quo  Relaxed  Tightened  Monopoly  Cartel  Subsidies  Subsidies  Maximum 
Price  1 (hundred $ per ton) 
Price 2 (hundred $ per ton) 
Minimill output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Integrated output 1 (million 
tons per annum) 
Minimill output 2 (million 
tons per annum) 
Quota level (million tons per 
annum) 
Minimill unit cost 2 
(hundred $ per ton) 
Welfare 1 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare 2 (billion 1985 $) 
Welfare costa  (%) 
Efficiency gap" (%) 
Integrated producer surplus 
(billion 1985 $) 

















2 1.39  16.48  24.07  28.06  50.54  15.55  30.7 1  5 1.49 
49.79  31.32  61.14  7.69  20.67  56.33  40.53  21.24 
71.84  47.95  86.10  36.20  71.21  7  I .48  72.47  72.74 























































-  ,2803 
.0023 
Note:  See note to table 6.2. 
"Welfare cost is measured as 
present value of free-trade welfare -  present value of actual welfare 
present value of benchmark consumption 
bEfficiency gap is eq. (7) expressed as a percentage. 
.Quota rents are the present value of  quota rents over both periods. 155  Trade and Industrial Policy for a “Declining” Industry 
6.7  Conclusion 
Policies to favor new industries over old are at the crux of the debate on 
industrial policy in many countries. The steel industry provides an interesting 
case study of an industry that can be thought of as containing both declining 
and expanding subsectors, both of which compete in the short term with im- 
ports for the same market. What this paper suggests is that the answer to the 
question of in which direction the industry should be pushed depends on mar- 
ket structure, costs, and demand conditions. In the case of the US.  steel indus- 
try, taking the level of imports as the relevant constraint, the existing industry 
structure is inefficient, but cost estimates are crucial to deciding in which di- 
rection the industry should be pushed. Taking the existing industry structure as 
given, small changes in trade and industrial policy can affect welfare, but the 
conclusions are very sensitive to the disposition of the rents created under the 
VER programs. It is quite possible that restricting imports is welfare increas- 
ing, given the imperfectly competitive nature of the steel industry. 
These results  must be qualified by  the relatively  simple structure of  the 
model used and the crude nature of the data used in calibration. Perhaps more 
fundamental, however, is the structure of the model itself. A particular worry 
is the fact that integrated plants are assumed to exit after five years of opera- 
tion. Clearly with some expenditures  it is possible to keep these plants op- 
erating over a period longer than the next five years. Endogenizing this decision 
is the next logical step to take in model construction. 
References 
Baldwin, R., and P.  Krugman. 1988a. Market access and international competition: A 
simulation study.” In Empirical methods in international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cam- 
bridge: MIT Press. 
. 1988b. Industrial policy and international competition in wide-bodied jet air- 
craft. In Trade policy issues  and empirical  analysis, ed. R. E.  Baldwin. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Barnett, D., and R. W.  Crandall, 1986. Upffom the ashes: The rise of the steel minimill 
in the United States. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institutio,n. 
Barnett, D., and  L. Schorsch.  1983. Steel:  Upheaval  in  basic industry. Cambridge, 
Mass.: Ballinger. 
Crandall, R. W.  1981. The U.S. steel  industry in recurrent crisis, Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution. 
Dixit, A. K. 1988. Optimal trade and industrial policies for the U.S. automobile indus- 
try. In Empirical methods for international trade, ed. R. Feenstra. Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Harris, R. G. 1988. A guide to the GET model. Department of Finance, Government of 
Canada, Ottawa. 
. 1989. The new protectionism revisited.  Canadian Journal of Economics  22 
(4)  75  1-78. 156  Richard G.  Harris 
Jones, K. 1986. Politics vs  economics in world steel trade. London: Allen & Unwin. 
Jondrow, J.  1978. Effects of trade restrictions on imports of steels. In The impact of 
international trade and  investment on employment, US. Department of Labor, Bu- 
reau of  International Labor Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. 
Keeling, B. 1982. The world steel industry: Structure andprospects in the 1980s. Econ- 
omist Intelligence Unit Special Report, no. 128. London. 
Tarr, D., and M. Morkre. 1984.  Aggregate costs to the United States of tariffs and quotas 
on imports. Washington, D.C.: Federal Trade Commission. 